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THE GOAL OF FORECASTING – PREDICTABILITY OF
CASH FLOW REVISIONS IN CORPORATE FINANCE
Research paper
Florian Knöll, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Karlsruhe, Germany, knoell@kit.edu
Abstract
Accuracy of forecasts is essential for organizational units, such as accounting. The accuracy of business–
related forecasts generally depends on individual and organizational biases. Biases, resulting from
anchoring and adjustment heuristics, incentivization for earnings management as a personal objective,
and company goals alter the forecaster’s opinion on the future outcome. Studies in business analytics
suggest that detectable forecasting patterns occur, if these biases are present. This paper argues that a
bias not only distorts forecast revisions, but –depending on the importance level of the bias– that the
goal to produce accurate forecasts has a marginalized influence in the presence of the bias. Such a bias
supersedes the previous goal and recommends a disentanglement of the forecasting process. Empirical
analysis of judgmental cash flow forecasts in a business corporation supports the hypothesis for an
organizational bias. Concealment of information goes along with this bias, alters forecast revisions, and
has a substantial impact on the forecasting process. Therefore, incorporation of the findings into future
organizational arrangements, strategic understanding, and accounting information systems is necessary.
Keywords: Corporate Cash Flow Accounting, Forecast Revision Process, Earnings Management, Forecast
Implications, Organizational Bias, Margin Target Orientation.
1 Introduction
The pivotal role of cash flows in corporate finance of multinational firms has been addressed in several
research papers (Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach, 2004; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kim, Mauer,
and Sherman, 1998; Lim and Wang, 2007; Martin and Morgan, 1988; Stulz, 1990). Underlying cash
flow forecasts are crucial to corporate management activities in the finance sector, as management often
uses these forecasts to determine foreign-exchange risks resulting from foreign business activities. Since
accurate forecasts provide a basis for hedging options to cover currency exposures, inaccuracies in these
forecasts can result in increased hedging costs or uncovered currency risks. Corporations that operate
worldwide and manage these risks typically have at least one financial information system with forecasting
processes on a regular basis (e.g., monthly or quarterly). The sequence of an initial forecast and revised
forecasts is referred to as forecasting process and the sequence of revisions is usually referred to as
revisioning. Subsidiaries of the corporation generate forecasts for cash flow items and send thousands of
forecasts and revisions to corporate headquarters. These forecasts are aggregated and provide the basis
for corporate–wide key performance indicators (KPIs) and management activities. One example of such
a KPI (Marr, 2012) is the Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization (EBITDA),
which is important in the context of this paper, because it is one of the primary proxies for a company’s
current operating profitability.
However, most of todays forecasting processes are the result of human judgment (Sanders and Manrodt,
2003), and studies suggest that latent human influences must not be underrated, as they affect corporations’
forecasting and planning in many ways (Hogarth and Makridakis, 1981). Several studies provide evidence
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of the behavioral aspects that play a significant role in judgmental forecasting. A comprehensive literature
research on this topic is given in Lawrence et al. (2006). Also, experiments reveal that several sources of
information change the way in which forecasters adjust (Leitner and Leopold-Wildburger, 2011). The
sources of information for forecasters inside subsidiaries are often heterogeneous, providing differing
perspectives on the internal state of a subsidiary, while organizational structures1 and dependencies of
the corporation define a framework for each subsidiary (e.g., earnings thresholds as shown by Daniel,
Denis, and Naveen, 2008), which can affect forecasts as well as forecast adjustments and introduce
organizational biases (Knöll, Setzer, and Laubis, 2018).
For instance, operations ensure meeting specified EBITDA margin targets in organizations, which results
in tendencies to control cash flows (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006; Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999).
Therefore, the management of earnings may result in shifts of cash outflow realizations –within the terms
of credit– forward to the next fiscal year, if the annual EBITDA margin is expected to be too low.
Besides the representation of the operating realizations, subsidiaries tend to align figures according to
corporate planning (Kudla, 1976). The subsidiaries’ operating managers try to reach planning figures,
as most subsidiaries provide incentivization on a financial level (e.g. bonus payments), which might
emotionally drive people decisions (Noval, 2016).
Detecting organizational and human biases in cash flows provides means to improve business performance,
especially as corporations rely on risk minimization methods, such as currency hedging for the conserva-
tion of future cash flow values (Stulz, 1996). These methods require an adequate expectation of cash flow
realizations, which are provided by the subsidiaries in the form of forecasts. In every subsidiary a manager
dedicated to forecasting should provide accurate forecasts to the best of his knowledge for the corpora-
tion. A subsidiary’s forecasts made by human individuals, however, might be biased by organizational
structures. The aforementioned operations and planning activities might result in information asymmetry
for the subsidiaries’ forecasters, making it difficult to provide accurate forecasts to the corporation. For
instance, these biases can result in subsidiaries trying to hide bad news (comparable to earnings forecasts
as reported by Penman, 1980).
In other words, operational structures and business probably limits the predictability of cash flows by
earnings management and managerial planning incentivization. However, interlinking organizational
structures and personal incentives to corporate goals might be especially prone when the subsidiaries’
forecasting managers are independent of the holding corporation. If corporations are unaware of these
dependencies that affect the forecasts, inaccurate risk management may result. This may cause additional
effort and costs (John, 1993), at the latest when forecasts are hedged.
While researchers mostly are aware of the challenges, there is practically no research available that
empirically analyzes a corporation’s internal forecasts in relation to the diverse managerial aspects (and
biases) of planning, operations, and forecasting. As internal data is difficult to acquire, this would explain
why there has not been any comprehensive analysis of internal cash flow forecasts and of how their
revisions relate to these organizational biases to date. Thus, corporate financial departments have little
guidance on how to assess the quality of their heterogeneous forecasts and how to reduce dependencies in
order to improve forecasting processes.
Hereof, the method recently shown in Knöll and Simko (2017) for the proxies of return margins is applied
to transfer findings from finance research (such as in earnings forecasts) to cash flow forecasting. This
study provides the following contributions to the literature: First, it is argued that pursuing annual return
targets introduces an organizational bias on forecast adjustments. Identifying the pattern of concealed
information, which systematically influences the forecast revisions, this paper shows that forecast and
their revisions probably do not reflect the entire internal view of a subsidiary. Second, analyses quantify
dependencies of the assumed organizational bias on the corporation’s purpose of forecasting processes.
1 This paper refers to organizational structures as “the existing parts within the organization or company and the processes
of how these parts interact with each other.” A more detailed introduction to the terms can be found in Ranson, Hinings, and
Greenwood (1980).
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth, UK, 2018 2
Knöll / The Goal of Forecasting
Here, the interpretation of the analyses reveals that managed cash flow earnings and pursued targets
distort forecast revisions, thus undermining the original goal of forecasting processes – to receive an
accurate representation of upcoming cash flows for the corporation. This study analyzes empirical data of
existing forecasting processes, instead of relying on data from management surveys. Therefore, this paper
avoids a biases that might be inherent in surveys: the additional workload for participants. Keeping in
mind that the corporate privacy policies ensure anonymity for the subsidiary managers and make surveys
impossible to relate the error, the subsequent analyses in this paper are expected to alter the understanding
of “the goal of forecasting” in corporate processes with financial information systems.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical dataset. Section 3
introduces the author’s notation and Section 4 introduces the research model for hypotheses, which is
based on related work on finance theory. The empirical design, analytical results, and interpretation are
then presented in Section 5. The final Section 6 of this paper discusses the implications and limitations of
this work for assessing organizational structure.
2 Empirical Data
The data used in the analysis stems from a record of cash flow forecasts and realizations provided by
a multinational sample corporation. The corporation is headquartered in Germany, but has worldwide
operating subsidiaries. With about 110,000 employees, the company generates annual revenues in the
billion Euro range. The corporation has more than 300 separate legal entities, including their subsidiaries.
The subsidiaries are grouped into three distinct divisions, based on their fundamentally different business
portfolios: “Agricultural products” (AP), “health and pharmaceuticals” (HP), and “industrial materi-
als” (IM). Entities with business portfolios belonging to more than one division are summarized under a
fourth artificial division, “diverse” (DV).
Each subsidiary officially operates independently of the corporation, even though there are some important
dependencies in the organizational structure. (1) The figures of corporate planning are defined in agreement
with the subsidiaries. Based on the set of local plans, the corporation re–adjusts the planning to an overall
view and defines the requirements for local operations being rated as “successful” subsidiaries. (2) As the
subsidiaries operate independently, they have their own financial system and a heterogeneous payment
structure (e.g., incentivization bonuses), and they have to ensure liquidity for their operations (e.g.,
with earnings management processes). (3) Each subsidiary that participating in the forecasting process
–mostly large-volume entities– enters their expectations on future cash flows in a corporate IT-system.
Forecasts accessible are aggregated for corporate risk management to apply hedging measures and further
instruments. Figure 1 depicts the interactions between the corporation and a subsidiary. Planning figures,
forecasts, and realization volumes are needed to be communicated, but the responsible managers (planner,
forecaster, and earnings manager) have mostly restricted access (as a personal view) to the internal state
of the subsidiary.
Financial risk management is centralized, with the local subsidiaries reporting cash flows to the corpora-
tion’s central finance department. It receives cash flow forecasts generated by the subsidiaries worldwide,
denominated in foreign currencies. After the realization date, the corporation receives the cash flow
figures for realizations (hence, “actual”) every month. The forecasts and actual data available for the
analyses cover invoices issued (II) and invoices received (IR) in the corporate IT system. Delivered by
the subsidiaries on a quarterly basis, the forecasts cover intervals with horizons of up to 15 months
(five quarters). The dataset for actual invoices ranges from January 2008 to December 2013 with the
corresponding forecasts covering the actuals’ period. In total, actuals and forecasts are available for the 99
largest subsidiaries, while the generated forecasts of a subsidiary cover the individual subset of currencies
in which it issues and receives invoices – resulting in 44 different currencies for the dataset. Overall, the
raw dataset consists of 20,472 monthly invoice actuals, with five associated forecasts each. Table 1 gives a
brief summary of the dataset.
Twenty-Sixth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2018), Portsmouth, UK, 2018 3
Knöll / The Goal of Forecasting
Planner	  
Earnings	  
Manager	  
Forecaster	  
Reaching	  
EBITDA	  
Planned	  
Target	   Internal	  State	  
Subsidiary	  
Corpora9on	  
Risk	  Management	   Accoun9ng	  Corp.	  Planning	  
Accurate	  
Forecas9ng	  
Figure 1. Organizational structure in corporate forecasting. The figure shows the corporation’s three
directed dependencies for the managers within one exemplary subsidiary.
Divisions Subsidiaries Currencies Actual Time Series Forecasts
AP 12 16 70 17,010
HP 19 26 146 29,070
IM 13 8 52 13,460
DV 53 37 216 42,820
All 99 44 484 102,360
Table 1. The summary of available cash flow data.
Additionally, partial data from the corporation’s annual report are used for testing the hypotheses in
Section 5. In the annual report 2011 the EBITDA margins listed are 22.8 % (AP), 27.4 % (HP), and 10.8 %
(IM). Official figures for division DV were not reported separately. In 2012, the figures were: 24.0 % (AP),
27.2 % (HP), and 10.9 % (IM). The figures in 2013 were comparable in magnitude, namely, 25.5 % (AP),
28.2 % (HP), and 9.5 % (IM).
3 Notation and Forecasting Process
Denoting the actual (realization) of cash flow item i as A(i), the lead time t of a forecast tF(i) for A(i)
refers to the number of revision periods (i.e., in terms of a quarter of the year) until the actual date (t = 0).
For instance, with an initial forecast at t = 5 the earliest forecast 5F(i) is delivered with a lead time of five
periods and is revised four times until the last one–period–ahead forecast 1F(i) is generated. Figure 2
visualizes the temporal structure of the forecasting process in five steps for an actual A(i). Subscripts
m, y, and e denote the realization month, realization year, and the ID of the corresponding subsidiary of
the actual. Superscript g denotes the type of the actual (g ∈ {invoice issued (II), invoice received (IR)}).
Therefore, the maximum indexing for an actual is Age,y,m(i). If an index is irrelevant or obvious in the
context, the respective index is omitted for reasons of brevity. The use of F instead of A in the notation
refers to individual forecasts.
Because the corporate planning is determined on an aggregate level the cash flow forecasts are accumulated
up to this level. As a proxy for percentage return margin within a fiscal year for a specific subsidiary
(e = E), the computation of the entity’s ratio R uses aggregated revenues (II) and expenses (IR). The ratio
for in the M-th month of a year Y and the K months (K < M) before M is shown in Equation (1).
RK(AY,M) =
∑1≤ j≤K A
g=II
y=Y,m=M− j
∑1≤ j≤K A
g=IR
y=Y,m=M− j
Y specific year
M specific month
K aggregated number of months
(1)
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Figure 2. Temporal structure of cash flow forecasts tF(i) for the corresponding actual A(i).
For instance, R22010,11 refers to the ratio of all cash flows from September to November 2010, while a ratio
above one indicates the presence of more revenues than expenses (positive return). The notation R(AY,M)
omits the superscript K, if K = M−1, and is an aggregation of all realized cash flows in year y = Y up to
(and including) month m = M. Since ratios are specific for an entity e, for reasons of comparability this
work focuses on normalized ratios Rn with values between zero and one per entity. Normalized ratios are
obtained by subtracting the minimum ratio within an entity from R and dividing by the difference of its
maximum and minimum ratio.
The suggested annual return margin target (target) that an entity E has to reach at the end of the year
is defined as T (Ay=Y ) in year y = Y , and T n(AY ) as the normalized target. As targets are unknown
(to me), but business development measured with EBITDA figures seem rather stable over the years,
the target in y = Y is estimated by averaging the December actual ratios of the three preceding years
(Rn(Ay=Y− j,m=12), with j ∈ {1,2,3}). The revision for ratios is defined as 12Rn = Rn(1F)−Rn(2F), and
describes the adjustment from the second last forecast to the last forecast before the actual. The paper uses
the last revision because generally the latest judgmental forecast incorporates the most information and is
the most accurate (McNees, 1990). The difference from target is defined as TargetDiff = T n(A)−Rn(1F).
Finally, the error is Errn = Rn(A)−Rn(1F). Ratios and revisions are not stored in the database but derived
from the invoice items as shown in Equation (1). Table 2 gives a brief overview of the defined metrics.
Notation Metric Notation Metric
Rn(1F) Forecast Ratio (normalized) TargetDiff Difference from target
Rn(Ay,m) Actual Ratio (normalized) 12Rn Revision (normalized)
T n(Ay) Target (normalized) Errn Error (normalized)
Table 2. Notation used in the analyses.
4 Research Design
This section discusses the theoretical background for the hypotheses and additional assumptions before the
four new hypotheses follow. The theoretical background is based on Burgstahler and Eames (2006), where
the authors analyzed published cash flow forecasts and actuals of firms as a function of the expectations
of market analysts. While Burgstahler and Eames (2006) focus the management of cash flows on the outer
shell of firms, this paper analyzes the internal forecasts and actuals within the sample corporation. The
first two hypotheses in this paper should be considered an advancement of the results of Burgstahler and
Eames (2006), since the current data and hypotheses cover the internal firm forecasts and actuals – from
which official market reports are derived later on. The background is further based on Easterwood and
Nutt (1999), where the authors analyzed the impact of previous forecast errors on the change of following
forecasts revisions. Their research led to the question of whether the forecast revisions are influenced by
organizational structures (and not only by the error), resulting in the third and fourth hypotheses.
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The difficulty for corporations lies in their need for a well–aligned management of planning, forecast-
ing, and operations. To align the management to recent, current, and future business development, the
corporation requires information from the subsidiaries. Information is provided through managers (and
information systems) that have the possibility to access a perspective on the internal state of the subsidiary,
which often requires preprocessing information to a view required by the corporation. The amount of
work involved in planning, forecasting, and operations often implies sharing of tasks by several managers.
When organizational structure motivates one manager (e.g. with incentivization payment), but not the
other ones, an organizational biased view might occur for some of the information–giving managers. As a
result, organizational biased forecasters might provide a view that incorporates inaccuracies in the forecast
data. These inaccuracies originate partly from the concealment of information, defined as “the state when
managers are not well aligned in terms of amount and quality of information”, e.g. when one side hides
information (unintentionally). Hence, the following hypotheses are made:
Hypothesis (H1). Organizational biases can result in forecasting that follows a pattern defined as the
concealment of information.
Hypothesis (H2). Corporate planning (as an organizational bias) can pave the way for revision adjust-
ments in decentralized forecasting processes.
After identification of organizational biases in subsidiaries (concealment of information and corporate
planning), it will be analyzed whether corporate operations are well aligned to the goal of accurate fore-
casting. Structures in processes of operations might alter the realizations (e.g., with earnings management)
that are compared to forecasting figures. These changes can have serious implications on forecast error
measures. These new hypotheses aim at disentangling the “goal of forecasting” for corporations from the
managerial “goal of forecasting”, as influences of organizational structures are to be expected to alter the
former goal.
The intention behind the corporation’s “goal of forecasting” is that forecasters should provide perspectives
for future expectations and should try to minimize the forecast error, which can be understood as an
organizational bias itself on forecast processes. The assumption is that forecasting process might have
a random baseline, but more importantly, to underline the foretold intention, in a forecast process the
forecasting adjustments should depend on actual realizations, which yields in the Hypothesis (H3).
Hypothesis (H3). Organizational structures as a bias (i.e., the corporate goal of accurate forecasting)
can alter or distort forecasting processes.
Hypothesis (H4). The goal for forecasters can change in dependence of organizational biases.
When tasks of planning, forecasting, and accounting are interlinked to some extent, however, pursuing
planned annual return targets can systematically influence both actual and forecast adjustments, with a
comprehensive perspective being required. Tasks of forecasting, planning, and operations can be assigned
to different managers. Forecasters who actually focus to intentionally give purposeful forecasts can,
however, provide organizationally biased forecasts – suggesting a trade-off between the internal view
they have, planned figures, and the operational view. This trade-off becomes even more rigid when the
dedicated forecaster is also involved in planning and operating tasks within the subsidiary. For example, a
forecaster tries to integrate known planning figures, previous and upcoming earnings management, with
own expectations. But, however, this forecaster might give more credit to the expected annual return
targets than to the internal state of the subsidiary. Depending on the importance of such biases, the
combination of organizational biases can substantially distort the goal of forecasting from producing
accurate forecasts to forecasting of ambiguous and even misleading organizational influences, resulting
in Hypothesis (H4). While Hypothesis (H3) requires that accurate forecasting (the goal of forecasting
for corporations) relates to revisions, this relation incidentally is a precondition for the analysis of (H4),
requiring two competing goals.
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5 Empirical Analysis
This section presents the test design for the hypotheses. In addition, empirical results based on linear
regression analysis are provided, together with the interpretation of the results. For testing the hypotheses,
it is assumed that the derived target ratios are linked to the percentage EBITDA margin figures of the
company. This assumption seems to be plausible, as derived EBITDA figures result from realized revenues
(by invoices issued) and expenses (by invoices received). The assumption is supported by the percentage
EBITDA margin figures published in the annual report, which are in line with the ranks of division ratios
for December values (not reported in this paper). This allows retaining a substitute for percentage EBITDA
margins. Further, the experiments used the provided tools in R for linear regression and hypothesis testing
(R Core Team, 2013).
5.1 Revision Strength Influenced by Reaching Targets
As noted before, organizational structures define that reaching planned targets is an important strategic goal.
If subsidiaries’ forecasts are adjusted to follow these targets, a pattern of concealing information inside
the subsidiary may occur. The resulting pattern for Hypothesis (H1) will drive adjustments differently for
revisions depending on the entities’ current expected performance. Here, the performance above the target
is perceived as good current state and a performance below the target as a bad current state. The target is
expected to serve as a threshold value for the subsidiaries (as motivated by Daniel, Denis, and Naveen,
2008). In order to conceal bad news, adjustments should increase more strongly when the state seems bad
(or not as good as required) and should decrease with a good state –but not as fast as the bad news. As a
result, some of the good news can be held back for worse times of the subsidiary, which indicates the
avoidance of bad news by using concealment. The expectation on Hypothesis (H2) is a dependency of
the target and revision, together with a decrease of adjustments over time, as the current forecast ratio
approaches to the target. A schematic diagram of the expected adjustments is given in Figure 3.
Calendar Month!
Re
vis
ion
 to
wa
rd
s T
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ge
t!
Target!
Figure 3. Expected revision pattern to conceal bad news. Current performance below the target
increases the revision upward and performance above the target decreases the revision. The
magnitude of revisions for performance below the target should be much higher compared to
a performance above the target.
To test the relationship, the regression for 12Rn uses one boolean variable for the relation between annual
target and forecast ratio (TargetDiff(+)), while the other state of the boolean variable is indicated by the
intercept. Therefore, the intercept is renamed to “TargetDiff(−)”. Further the regression model uses the
month and interaction effects of month and TargetDiff(+), shown in Equation (2).
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Model 1: 12Rn = β0(TargetDiff(+))+β1(TargetDiff(−))+β2(Month) +
β3(TargetDiff(+)×Month)+ ε
(2)
where:
TargetDiff(+) = true (equals one) indicates that the forecast is below the target,
TargetDiff(−) = true (equals one) indicates that the forecast is above the target,
Month = the number of the month in the fiscal year, and
TargetDiff(+)×Month = interaction of the month of the fiscal year and the target relation,
stating that the forecast is below the target.
Table 3 shows the resulting estimates of the model. The results indicate that experts adjust ratios to match
these targets. The prediction for 12Rn is higher when the target ratio is underachieved (TargetDiff (+) :
Rn(1F) < T n(A)) compared to when it is overachieved (TargetDiff (−) : Rn(1F) > T n(A)). A positive
TargetDiff corresponds to an uptrend, while a negative TargetDiff relates to a downtrend. Especially bad
performing ratio forecasts have a high absolute estimate to adjust to the target, while already met targets
lead to a revision with an absolute estimate half that high, which supports Hypothesis (H1). The end of
the fiscal year has a significant influence on the revision of the forecast ratio. The revision has a tendency
to decrease over the year. But when the target is already met, the monthly reduction of revision is less
reduced. This effect is obvious from the estimates when the Month and the interaction term are combined:
−0.009+ 0.006 = −0.003. These results underline that the organizational target bias predefines the
revisions, and (H2) is supported. Thus, the Model 1 supports the hypotheses for the concealment of bad
news (H1) and link to planning figures (H2).
Dep. Variables for 12Rn Estimates Model 1
TargetDiff(+) 0.145 ∗∗∗
TargetDiff(−) − 0.063 ∗∗∗
Month − 0.009 ∗∗∗
TargetDiff(+)×Month 0.006 ∗∗
Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Observations: 2,355.
Table 3. Analytical model regressing revision with dependencies of TargetDiff and Month. The result
shows that revision in ratio is higher, if the forecast is below the target (TargetDiff(+)) when
compared to forecasts above the target (TargetDiff(−)).
5.2 Target Influence on Revision
Forecast adjustments that are strongly influenced by the target, giving rise to the question what influences
would justify the revisions of the expert with regard to the Hypotheses (H3) and (H4). The intention
is to analyze what influences a model considers to be essential for revisioning. For this purpose, the
manager’s revisioning is regressed with a model that can access actuals, and another model that can
additionally access suggested earnings targets. By analogy with the approach in Easterwood and Nutt
(1999), this paper uses the methodology to perform a regression of the revision using forecast errors. But
contrary to the analysis of the impact of last year’s error this paper analyzes the impact of the current
error (Errn) on the revision. The intention is to determine the biases that influence the revision. Additional
explanatory variables could then be taken into account for future analyses. Due to the chronological
sequence of forecasts and actuals, this approach does not allow the revision to be predicted, but rather
possible influences for the revision to be determined (as retrospective analysis).
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First, Model 2 analyzes the dependency of revisions on the difference from the actual ratio (Equation 3).
Revision 12Rn is expected to be dependent on the actual error Errn (minimization of Rn(A)−Rn(1F)
symbolizes the goal of forecasting) and to be independent of the Constant (symbolizes indistinguishable
biases in forecasting, including target focus and operational earnings management). In the resulting
model, Constant should have a small estimate of low significance, while Errn should have a significant
influence. If Errn has an insignificant estimate, this would suggest that the revision is not influenced by
the corporation’s goal of forecasting, to provide accurate forecasting to the corporation.
Second, (H4) requires a comprehensive perspective on dependencies. Integrating the previous organi-
zational bias of (H2) leads to the disentanglement of the effect TargetDiff from the Constant, resulting
in the Model 3 (Equation 4). The expectation according to the Hypothesis (H4) requires TargetDiff to
play a significant role in the regression model. The revision’s dependency on TargetDiff should imply a
significant estimate with higher magnitude in comparison to the other variables (Errn and Constant).
Model 2: 12Rn = β0 +β1(Errn)+ ε (3)
Model 3: 12Rn = β0 +β1(Errn)+β2(TargetDiff)+ ε (4)
The results are presented in Table 4. Model 2 shows that Constant is not significant, while Errn has
a significant effect on 12Rn, which supports the Hypothesis (H3). Model 3 shows that revisions are
organizationally biased by Errn and experts adjust the ratio in relation to TargetDiff . As anticipated from
the results of the Hypotheses (H1) and (H2), the organizational bias TargetDiff distorts the forecasting
process in Model 3. Expecting that accurate forecasting is the primary goal of forecasting processes,
the strength of the estimate of Errn is expected to be the highest. However, estimates clearly show that
TargetDiff overlays this goal with an estimate nearly five times that high. These estimates suggests that the
model assigns more importance to the target (T n(A)) than to the actual ratio (Rn(A)) for the forecaster’s
revisioning (12Rn). The goal of managers seems to be different from the corporation’s original goal of
the forecasting process, which supports the Hypothesis (H4). However, the comparison shows that the
integrated variables all have negative estimates. This states that revisioning depend on organizational
structures – but at least their impact is not diametrically to each other in the practical application.
Dep. Variables for 12Rn Estimates Model 2 Estimates Model 3
Constant − 0.003 − 0.002
Errn − 0.246 ∗∗∗ − 0.049 ∗
TargetDiff (Not Utilized) − 0.242 ∗∗∗
Significance levels: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; Observations: 2,355.
Table 4. Comparison of models to explain the revision in ratio. Estimates show that revision is strongly
influenced by the actual error Errn, as long as TargetDiff is not included.
5.3 The Goal of Forecasting
The results with support for Hypotheses (H3) and (H4) might seem simple, but their implications are
wide-ranging, which will be stated with the following conjecture: If theoretically perfect information
of the forecaster is assumed by knowing the actual ratio in advance, the estimates of Model 3 indicate
that revisioning behavior primarily depends (linearly) on the difference from the target compared to
the information an expert could use to maximize the accuracy. This conjecture gives further support
for the Hypothesis (H4). Summarizing: From the perspective of the forecaster, the models emphasizes
that providing accurate forecasts is not as important as pursuing an annual earnings target. But, other
influencing biases on revisions could exist besides the earnings target’s influence and managed earnings,
and could be integrated into the regression, dampening the effects.
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6 Conclusions and Outlook
Analyzing the cash flow forecast data of a large multinational corporation, this paper provides one
of the first empirical revision analysis of financial forecasting processes with managerial accounting–
related organizational biases. The analysis of corporate margins reveals that forecasting processes with
organizational biases exist. These organization–level biases relate to behaviors in operations management,
e.g. earnings management, and awareness of planned activities, e.g. difference from target, and lead to
systematic biasing of revisions of the forecasting processes. Results indicate that including organizational
biases into accounting is the key to explaining results in business forecasting.
In this research, two research gaps are addressed: First, providing insights into corporate invoice forecast
processes and revisioning and, second, uncovering systematic effects and biases on the aggregate level,
where hedging takes place. For corporations, it is important to understand how business environment-
related strategies may affect forecasting accuracy in order to decrease hedging costs. In particular, risk
management must incorporate planning figures and earnings management to some degree for reaching
an unbiased perspective. Otherwise, the biased perspective would impair risk management and hedging
activities. In view of the fact that netting effects take place, with positive invoices (II) canceling the effect
of negative invoices (IR), the influence of the findings must not be underrated for skewed distributions of
invoices that would create additional risks or costs for unnecessary hedging.
From a managerial perspective, the results provide new insights into how organizational structures
influence the purpose of the forecasting task. The endeavor to align forecasts to target figures determines
how revisions are made. The accuracy and the forecast quality seem to become less important for the
human forecasters than other external and organizational influences. This does not mean that the human
forecasts have a bad accuracy per se. The analyses revealed that reaching the target does not conflict with
accurate forecasting for the revision behavior. But aligning the goal of forecasting for individuals with
the corporation’s goals seems to be beneficial. As a result, organizations that want accurate forecasts for
invoice margins from managers should consider motivating purposeful forecasts, for example through
dedicated incentives for forecasters.
In sum, the findings bridge the gap between forecasting research and organizational biases within man-
agement research for digital innovation in corporations. The results provided are relevant to corporate
leadership, management strategies, information technology, and business analytics. Altering the under-
standing of “the goal of forecasting”, corporate leaders can iteratively measure the impact of a managerial
incentive system and build strategies to change organizational structures and their dependencies. For
instance, to improve awareness of upcoming earnings management activities, the information might be
communicated to the forecasters within an IT system. Business analytics benefits from the information
provided, as forecast correction services could incorporate dependencies stored in the IT system in order
to improve the forecast accuracy. First experiments with forecast correction techniques based on this
research were successful. This led to a project with the research partner, the corporation that provided
the analyzed data, to realize automated checks of the validity of aggregated forecasts within a forecast
support system.
The study is subject to a few limitations. The pursuit of annual return targets and forecast accuracy
can be relevant in many companies. But the combination of incentivization, earnings management, and
organizational planning leads to revisions most likely depending on the business context and organizational
structure. The dependencies can look different in the case of another structure, business models, or
organizational biases.
Improvement processes of corporate risk assessment have an essential need of understanding interlinks of
organizational structures and individuals, especially beyond the organizational borders of the corporation.
An approach for improvement should account for all relevant organizational levels, and besides taking
managerial actions, future research work might reveal alternatives. The analyzed organizational target
bias and further measurement of so far unknown biases might disclose the latent motivations of forecasts
in detail. It is concluded that the knowledge of these biases, together with the predictive value for decision
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support systems, drives subsequent forecast correction approaches to retrieve highly accurate forecasts for
accounting information systems. The effort to implement these information processes might be high, but
the resulting opportunities seem to be even greater.
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